China's need for vast amounts of minerals to sustain its high economic growth rate has led Chinese investors to acquire stakes in natural resource companies, extend loans to mining and petroleum investors, and write long-term procurement contracts for oil and minerals in Africa, Latin America, Australia, Canada, and other resource-rich regions. These efforts to procure raw materials might be exacerbating the problems of strong demand; "locking up" natural resource supplies, gaining preferential access to available output, and extending control over the world's extractive industries. But Chinese investment need not have a zero-sum effect if Chinese procurement arrangements expand, diversify, and make more competitive the global supplier system. Previous Peterson Institute research (see Moran 2010) and new research undertaken in this paper, show that the majority of Chinese investments and procurement arrangements serve to help diversify and make more competitive the portion of the world natural resource base located in Latin America. For a more comprehensive analysis, we conduct a structured comparison of four Peruvian mines with foreign ownership: two Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-based, and two Chinese. We examine what conditions or policy measures are most effective in inducing Chinese investors to adopt international industry standards and best-practices, and which are not. We distill from this case study some lessons for other countries in Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere that intend to use Chinese investment to develop their extractive sectors: first, that financial markets bring accountability; second, that the host country regulatory environment makes a significant difference; and third, that foreign investment is a catalyst for change.
In recent years, China has used financing arrangements and direct investment to gain secure access to oil, metals, and foodstuffs from governments around Latin America. In many cases loans are secured against revenues from future sales to Chinese companies or granted at rates subsidized by the statecontrolled China Development Bank (CDB). Most prominent are deals to obtain oil from Brazil and Venezuela (China has promised to provide more than $32 billion to the Chavez government, which will pay off its debt in oil), and soy, wheat, and natural gas from Argentina. Official data shows that Venezuela now sends about 460,000 barrels a day (about 20 percent of its oil exports) to China. In Ecuador, the Chinese oil company PetroChina has lent $1 billion to state company PetroEcuador in exchange for oil deliveries. The China Development Bank also agreed to lend $1 billion to Ecuador's government, to be repaid through oil exports. In the case of Venezuela and countries like Argentina and Ecuador, who have both previously defaulted on international debt, access to such amounts of capital would otherwise be very difficult. According to a study of CDB's activities "virtually no other financial institutions were willing to lend such large amounts of capital for such long terms" (Downs 2011, 1) .
China has also been active in infrastructure development projects in Latin America. The CDB has offered a $2.6 billion 10-year loan to revive a freight train system connecting Buenos Aires to much of Argentina's central heartland. In the country's Rio Negro province, the Metallurgical Corporation of China has invested $80 million to reactivate an iron ore mine, and China's Beidahuang Group has promised $1.4 billion in irrigation infrastructure in exchange for a 20-year contract to grow corn, wheat, soy, and dairy on otherwise dry land for Chinese consumers.
Latin America has grown in importance to China over the past decade: Over half of Chinese investment in natural resources is in Latin American countries, concentrated in some thirty-four major projects (see appendix I) that stretch from Venezuela and Ecuador, through Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru, to Argentina and Chile. Since initiating its "going out" strategy, encouraging its companies to become more competitive, China's total FDI in Latin America has increased nearly six-fold: from $285 million in 2004 to $ 1.6 billion in 2009. 3 What are the implications of Chinese investments in Latin American resources for world markets, and for individual Latin American host countries? Are these investments part of a Chinese strategy to capture the world's resource base for China? Are there clear differences between Chinese owned and managed resource projects, and similar projects owned and managed by OECD-headquartered investors-with regard to labor practices, environmental practices, questionable payments, and corporate social responsibility? How can host policies in Latin America be structured-and enforced-to achieve most benefit from Chinese resource investments? 3 . MOFCOM (Ministry of Commerce People's Republic of China) in ISI Emerging Markets (2011). This paper first examines the impact of Chinese investments on world natural resource industries, testing whether the thrust of Chinese investment is to "lock up" global supplies, on the one hand, or to diversify and make more competitive sources of supply, on the other. The paper then turns to a structured case study of four major mining projects in Peru, comparing and contrasting the behavior of Chinese investors with the operations of a prominent non-Chinese investor according to a careful array of economic, social, and governance variables. The paper concludes with implications for developing and developed country policies, for multilateral lending institutions, and for international and local non-governmental organizations.
Chinese investment in LAtin AmeriCAn resOurCes: impLiCAtiOns fOr wOrLd mArkets
On the demand side, Chinese appetite for vast amounts of energy and minerals puts significant strain on international markets for oil, natural gas, iron ore, coal, copper, nickel, aluminum, and other materials.
On the supply side, Chinese companies-backed by the Chinese government-have been acquiring equity stakes in natural resource companies, extending loans to mining and petroleum investors, and writing long-term procurement contracts for oil and minerals in Africa, Latin America, Australia, Canada, and other resource-rich regions. These activities have aroused concern that Chinese efforts to procure raw materials might be exacerbating the problems of strong demand-locking up natural resource supplies, gaining preferential access to available output, extending control over the world's extractive industries.
But Chinese investments in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere need not have this zero-sum effect. Chinese efforts to procure raw materials might actually help solve the problems of strong demand.
Which outcome Chinese procurement arrangements generate depends upon whether those arrangements basically solidify a concentrated global supplier system (and enhance Chinese ownership/control within that concentrated supplier system), or expand, diversify, and make more competitive the global supplier system (and use Chinese ownership/control as a lever for such expansion, diversification, and enhanced competition).
What does evidence from Chinese resource procurement activities around the world show, and how do Latin American projects fit in?
The Chinese deployment of capital to procure natural resources takes four forms.
In the first procurement arrangement, Chinese investors take an equity stake in a very large already-established producer so as to secure an equity-share of production on terms comparable to other co-owners.
In the second procurement arrangement, Chinese investors take an equity stake in an up-andcoming producer so as to secure an equity-share of production on terms comparable to other co-owners.
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In the third procurement arrangement, Chinese buyers and/or the Chinese government make a loan to a very large already-established producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan.
In the fourth procurement arrangement, Chinese buyers and/or the Chinese government make a loan to finance an up-and-coming producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan.
These four structures provide the basis for giving operational definition to "tying up" supplies.
If the procurement arrangement simply solidifies legal claim to a given structure of production (first and third structures), tying up, or gaining preferential access to, supplies has zero-sum implications for other consumers. What is noteworthy, however, is that if the procurement arrangement expands and diversifies sources of output more rapidly than growth in world demand (second and fourth structures), the zero-sum implication vanishes as all consumers (including Chinese purchasers) have easier access to a larger and more competitive global resource base.
Drawing on PIIE research carried out earlier (Moran 2010) , appendix II shows a scorecard that classifies the sixteen largest Chinese natural resource procurement arrangements around the world within these four categories. The scorecard of China's procurement arrangements shows a few instances in which Chinese natural resource companies take an equity stake to create a special relationship with a major producer. But the predominant pattern (thirteen of sixteen projects) is to take equity stakes and/ or write long-term procurement contracts with the competitive fringe. A brief review of four smaller Chinese procurement arrangements undertaken at the same time does not suggest that there is significant selection-bias in looking at these sixteen largest projects. Three projects in Australia, Myanmar, and Canada show the characteristics of category II. One project in Indonesia, on the other hand, presented more of the characteristics of category I.
New research undertaken as part of this PIIE study provides a comprehensive examination of the universe of thirty-four Chinese natural resource investments and procurement arrangements in Latin America (see appendix I).
Twenty-five of the thirty-four Chinese investments and procurement arrangements serve to help diversify and make more competitive the portion of the world natural resource base located in Latin America. The preceding analysis holds some good news for Latin American host countries since it suggests that Chinese investors will be more willing to take on new frontier-or even fringe-projects that the major established oil and mining companies might pass by.
This strategy on the part of government-backed Chinese investors and lending agencies will not come as a surprise to those who have examined the evolution of the Japanese approach to natural resource procurement. In the early resource struggles of the 1970s, the Japanese government entertained the idea of creating the country's own major "national champion" resource companies, or engaging in strategies I and III to secure a special relationship with major resource companies and/or producer governments.
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From the late 1970s through the 1980s, however, Japanese policies shifted toward strategies II and IV, and Japanese procurement became a major force in enhancing the competitive structure of global extractive industries and diversifying the geography of production (Wells 1993) . Japanese participation in Latin American mining projects today consists primarily of minority equity stakes in a large array of extractive projects, backed by purchase contracts for a portion of the output.
Thus it is vitally important that Chinese investment-like Japanese investment-continue to help solve demand-side problems by multiplying and diversifying sources of supply for energy and minerals.
Chinese investment in LAtin AmeriCAn resOurCes: A COmpArisOn Of fOur prOjeCts (twO Chinese) in peru
Peru is a good Latin American case study because of its strong mining economy, open foreign investment regime, and longstanding presence of foreign mining companies-both OECD and Chinese-based.
It is one of China's top 10 destinations for mining investment (see figure 1) . Peru is the leading Latin American producer of gold, lead, silver, tellurium, tin, and zinc, and second most important regional producer of copper. In 2009, mining accounted for 6 percent of GDP and 60 percent of total exports and made up over 20 percent of Peru's $19.4 billion inward FDI (PROINVERSION, 2011) . This abundance of natural resources has made Peru the second largest destination for Chinese FDI in metals (see table 1 ).
According to Peru's investment authority, over 80 percent of Peru's 2010 FDI stock in the mining industry was sourced from OECD countries. Leading investors are the United Kingdom (45 percent), the United States (19 percent), followed by Brazil (15 percent), the Netherlands (5 percent), and Chile (4 percent). Canada, China, Japan, and "other" each comprise 3 percent (see figure 2 ).
China's interest in Peru has increased over the past decade. China has recently become the world's largest consumer of copper, consuming roughly 40 percent of world total in 2009. 4 Copper is used in products such as air conditioners and auto parts, both important Chinese exports. China is also, as of 1992, the world's largest consumer of iron ore. According to Peru's ministry of mines, annual copper production is expected to double in the next four years, from a current 1.2 million fine metric tons, with the initiation of several new projects. Peru is now the largest supplier to China of lead, and second largest supplier of copper and zinc. 5 China also relies heavily on other Latin American countries for its supply of copper, iron, and other products like soya beans and bovine meat. Chile is the number one supplier of 10 This has created a sense of inequity among the regions that do not receive Canon funds. The relatively recent decentralization coupled with the significant increase in revenue has also placed a disproportionate burden on regional and local governments that often do not have the training or capacity to administer such funds.
evolution of Civil society relations with the mines in peru
Peru has a long history with mining. Relations between the mines and the population affected by those mines has often been contentious. Historically, mining has been associated with environmental degra- In addition to plots to fix elections, the tapes revealed contact with Newmont executives. An investigation into whether Newmont gained the Yanacocha concession as a result of bribes was dropped after the statute of limitations expired.
framework agreement with the state, (2) it has made profits during the year in question, and (3) prices are "extraordinary" during the year of calculation.
When these "voluntary" contributions were introduced, there was very little capacity at the local and provincial level to create or manage local spending efficiently and effectively. The OECD mining companies desired that rather large amounts of local funds be spent wisely, without corruption, which led the OECD companies to engage in capacity building about how to manage public expenditures. This drive on the part of the OECD mining companies led the Chinese investor Chinalco toward wanting the same and engaging in the same. The OECD mining companies led a major change in the development of relations with international and local civil society. The traditional role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Peru was to monitor abuses, and engage in denuncias. Alongside this role, the OECD mining companies wanted to create new dialogues and partnerships with international and local NGOs, to pro-actively design and carry out programs related to community expenditures. The structure of the foreign investor civil society relationship changed, from purely confrontational to cooperative.
Over the past decade, civil society participation has increased considerably in Peru, particularly with respect to the relationship between communities and mines. Peru's Mines and Hydrocarbons law requires companies to consult with local communities through public hearings. In June 2010 the Peruvian Congress approved the Law on the Right to Prior Consultation for Indigenous or Native Peoples.
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This law requires that local communities be consulted on any regulatory change that may affect them.
Companies must now present their mandatory environmental impact assessments at public meetings in which local populations can ask questions and voice objections, which often must be taken into account.
It is assumed that in Peru, a project that does not obtain the so-called social license (such as the case of Manhattan mining) will not be able to proceed.
A benefit from having a mine locate in a region has traditionally been the creation of local jobs.
As mining has become more capital intensive and technologically complex, local communities have benefitted in that mining is less environmentally harmful and often safer than before. The skill set required for modern mining jobs is often not matched by the skill set of the local population, however.
In response, many mining companies have initiated economic development programs, including training and education, agricultural development, and other programs to help stimulate and develop economic generally populated by poor, largely indigenous, people. Mining companies often become targets for demands from these underserved populations, with the local populace expecting the companies to provide jobs as well as goods and services usually seen as public goods provided by government. As Epifanio
Baca (2010) writes, "over the last few years, socio-environmental conflicts between extractives companies and local communities have spread throughout several regions in Peru, due to the perception by these communities that their economic and social rights are being violated. Additionally, they face a State that has little capacity and political will to uphold the quite permissive socio-environmental regulations."
Changes in international mining standards
Over the past decade, international organizations, OECD donors, and international NGOs have intensified efforts to shed light on harmful mining practices, and have pushed to apply international standards to extraction activities in order to mitigate negative environmental and social externalities and to address the risks of corruption and mismanagement of government revenues from these activities. The result has been a clear trend in the mining industry towards integrating stakeholder concerns-with regard to labor practices, environmental practices, resource curse concerns, and corporate behavior-into operations.
Over the past decade or so, large-scale OECD-based mining companies have increasingly adopted a new model for resource extraction, aimed at mitigating the social and environmental impacts wreaked by traditional mining techniques.
The main forum for promoting transparency is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI is a coalition of governments, companies and other stakeholders, launched in 2002, which has developed an international standard for systematic reporting and auditing of payments by resource extracting companies and documenting the receipt of those payments by governments. Mining companies are also increasingly developing corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies and working with local communities to help build economic development strategies.
China does not participate in the EITI. Chinese companies are more likely to participate in the UN Global Compact, a business framework through which companies commit to aligning their behavior with ten universally accepted principles on human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption. Shankleman (2009, 4) writes that "neither the government of China, nor any Chinese oil or mining companies are active within EITI except where Chinese companies operate in countries that implement transparency systems." Peru, the host country for the subjects of our structured comparison, became an EITI candidate country in December 2010 and was designated "close to compliant" by the EITI Board. GDMDS. Grupo Propuesta is also an NGO but focuses more broadly on the decentralization process in Peru, promoting transparency and greater participation of civil society in the democratization process. As part of their mission, Grupo Propuesta monitors the contribution of mining companies to fondos and the cannon. The Grupo publishes an annual report on these activities and provide a transparency ranking on mining companies activities (see appendix III).
Changes in practices of Chinese Companies
There are signs that Chinese companies, at the urging of the Chinese government, are starting to conform more closely to international standards. Major Chinese companies generally operate within a framework established by China's state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).
Chinalco, one of our case study companies, is one of the companies under the supervision of SASAC. requiring that borrowers follow host country laws and regulations and specifying the need for social and environmental assessments for overseas projects. China has also reacted by developing alternative means of obtaining resources that avoid local community involvement by providing loan financing to state companies (i.e., Russia and Brazil) in exchange for a guaranteed volume of sales of the resultant gas or oil to Chinese oil companies.
the Case studies
In this paper, we examine two OECD cases and two Chinese-owned mines. Appendix III summarizes a more extensive comparison of the mines in terms of transparency, including publication of company practices and payment of social funds; fiscal practices, including payment of taxes and corrupt or questionable practices; treatment of workers, including safety practices, wages, and job creation for the local population; environmental practices; and corporate social responsibility. One major difference between Shougang and Toromocho is that the latter, which has reportedly secured a $21 billion loan from the China Export and Import Bank, will be subject to that entity's standards, revised in the mid-2000s.
Chinalco Toromocho has the opportunity to learn from both Antamina and Shougang's experiences.
It is already facing its first major challenge: the relocation of an entire town. Chinalco will spend $100 million to relocate the town of Morococha, a community of 3,400 inhabitants, which is currently located on the site where the mine will operate. According to Dr. Santillana, Chinalco has, so far, behaved much more cautiously and transparently than did Shougang, with more involvement of civil society.
What can the Peruvian government do to encourage firms to behave more like Antamina and less than Shougang? How can it avoid repeating the experience of several countries in Africa? A quick look at some indicators may provide some potential areas for action.
Peru has made significant economic strides since the early 1990s, gaining macroeconomic stability Table 2 shows that Peru has changed since the 1990s when Shougang began its operations. The increased scores on voice and accountability show the greater roles of civil society actors and political stability has significantly increased. The transition from Fujimori to democratic administrations in the 2000s has led to greater participation and trust in the political process, but no great improvements in the public administration and in deliveries of public goods, particularly those that allow a thriving private sector. Worrying, though, are the significant drops in Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption. The former illustrates one reason that mining companies in Peru attract so much attention
and are under such pressure to provide the public goods that government does not.
Compared to African countries, Peru seems in a relatively strong position. Table 3 shows Transparency International's corruption perceptions index for all African and Latin American countries with gold, copper, or iron ore mining. Peru's score of 3.5 is about average for Latin America, but better than all but five African countries.
LessOns And pOLiCy impLiCAtiOns
What are the lessons from this structured comparison of a Chinese and a non-Chinese mining project?
How can host policies in Latin America be structured-and enforced-to achieve most benefit from Chinese resource investments?
Our research has found that Chinese investment in Latin America predominantly expands and makes more competitive the global resource base. Chinese investors tend to be more willing to take on new frontier projects that others pass up.
This good news could turn to bad news, however, if Chinese companies, traditionally guided by a principle of nonintervention, are not held to high standards of corporate behavior. International standards have become more stringent over the past decade in terms of labor and environmental practices, transparency and control of corruption, and community outreach and support.
A company such as Yanacocha, which began with a problematic record in terms of community outreach, questionable practices, and environmental issues has, in the past decade, brought its practices up to international standards. Antamina, which began operations in the 2000s, has consistently helped set the standards in Peru. Shougang Hierro Peru, which does not participate in international forums, nor hold itself accountable to shareholders, has shown far less evidence of changed behavior. However, its expansion, financed by external creditors, will be a proving ground. Chinalco, under the guidelines of China's new policies towards foreign investment, shows efforts to meet international standards.
The bottom line is that how natural resource investors behave in a market depends on a number of factors-not just the source of the investment, though that matters as well, especially when it is in a country that has few mechanisms for transparency and accountability.
Here are several lessons that can be drawn from the Peruvian experience:
n Financial markets bring accountability. Investors that have to withstand scrutiny as they register their equity, raise capital, and seek multilateral assistance in international markets tend to adopt defensible standards, or face reputational risk. Supporting groups that monitor the activity of corporations helps to shed light on both positive and negative practices and helps encourage constructive behavior.
n The host country regulatory environment makes a big difference. The business environment (along with tolerance of civil society participation) was very different before and after the Fujimori regime in Peru, and the behavior of companies reflects this. Chinese investor behavior in some African countries reflects the inability or unwillingness of leaders to set or to enforce corporate behavior standards. Over the course of our research, weak institutional capacity and political will were cited repeatedly as factors limiting the potential for a positive development impact. The obligation to direct substantial tax revenues to provincial and local governments led OECD companies to set up 20 programs to help authorities spend the funds effectively, and to seek out partnerships and dialogue with civil society actors who could help. Business and nancial services 0.4% Coal, oil, and natural gas 4% Communications 3% Consumer products and electronics 0.3%
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Chalco 1. The transparency ranking is conducted by Grupo Propuesta Cuidadana, a Peruvian non-profit organization. The ranking is based on the a company's contirubtion to the Programa Minero de Solidaridad con el Pueblo (PMSP). The PMSP is a voluntary program of financial contriubtion to "mining funds" that finance projects to benefit the local and regional population. For more details about the ranking see http://www.descentralizacion.org.pe/. 
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Labor and environmental violations
The literature on Chinese FDI in African natural resources indicates that weak regulations, domestic regulations, and a lack of standardized rules and guidelines for Chinese companies operating abroad has resulted in extremely low pay, hazardous work environments, and local corruption. Below we outline a few cases.
Labor violations in Zambia
In 2005 49 workers were killed at the Chambishi copper mine in Zambia, during an explosion in the mines' explosives factory. An investigation of the incident revealed the explosion was caused by inadequate safety measures. However reports indicate that the Non-Ferrous Company Africa (the Chinese SOE that owns and operates the Chambishi mine) was never penalized, and in 2007 President Mwanawasa gave the go-ahead for the re-construction of the explosive factory (Haglund 2008) . In 2010 13 workers were shot during a protest opposing low wages and poor working conditions, held at the Chinese-run Collum coal mine in Zambia. Two Chinese supervisors, Xiao Lishan and Wu Jiuhua, were arrested and charged with attempted murder; however charges were dropped the following year (Bearak 2011) .
environmental violations in Zambia and Gabon
During the period of privatization that occurred in Zambia during the 1990s, the government applied 
